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Comments
DUE PROCESS, EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE
RIGHT TO TRAVEL: CAN ARTICLE 22 OF THE
WARSAW CONVENTION STAND UP TO
THESE CONSTITUTIONAL FOES?
BRITT MONTS

A RTICLE

22 OF the Warsaw Convention' is a controversial treaty provision that limits air carrier liability for
death, personal injury and loss of property resulting from in, Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 (1934),
reprinted in 49 U.S.C. § 1502 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as Warsaw Convention,
Convention or treaty]. The United States became a party to the Convention in October 1934. See Haskell, The Warsaw System and the US ConstitutionRevisited,39 J. AIR L &
CoM. 483, 485 (1973). Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention limits liability for death
or bodily injury to 125,000 "Poincare francs," a french unit of measure equivalent to
"65 1/52 milligrams of gold at the standard fineness of one hundred thousandths." In
United States dollars' the maximum recovery is approximately $8,300, based on the
price of gold in 1933, the year the United States devalued its currency. See Comment,
The Growth of Amencan Judicial Hostility Towards the Liability Limitations of the Warsaw
Convention, 48 J. AIR L. & CoM. 805, 810 (1983); Clare, Evaluation of Proposals to Increase
the "Warsaw Convention" Limit of PassengerLiabiliy, 46 J. AIR L. & COM. 53, 54 (1977).
The Convention limits liability for checked baggage and other cargo to 250 gold francs
per kilogram, unless additional insurance is purchased from the carrier by the owner.
Warsaw Convention, art. 22(2). But see Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines,
104 S. Ct. 1776 (1984) (finding that Congress, through delegation of authority to the
CAB, has specified the proper conversion standard under the Warsaw Convention in
cases involving losses of cargo. As a result, Article 22(2) is enforceable), discussed inftra
note 23 and accompanying text. Cf. Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, 690
F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that lack of specified conversion formula rendered
treaty unenforceable). Article 1 of the Warsaw Convention defines international
transportation.
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ternational air disasters. The provision has come under increasing attack in the United States during the past two
decades. 2 The liability limitations, however, were vitally important to the first international airlines.
During the 1930s, business leaders around the world convinced many governments that newly formed international
carriers would need protection from the potentially catastrophic recoveries available under tort law to the victims of
air disasters.' The technological and economic realities of air
travel during this period threatened the viability of affordable international transportation by air.4 Additionally, fundamental cultural, legal and commercial distinctions among
nations necessitated cooperation in the establishment of uniform industry practices.' With these considerations in mind,
President Roosevelt endorsed the Warsaw Convention and
the Senate approved it, as a treaty, in 1934.6
During fifty years of growth and maturity, the airline inSee generaly Comment, supra note 1; Comment, Limitationson Air CarrierLiablity. An
Inadvertent Return to Common Law Prtncitples,48 J. AIR L. & CoM. 111 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as Comment, Limitations].
:1 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L.
REv. 497 (1967). Two international conferences were held: one in Paris in 1925 and
another in Warsaw in 1929. Id at 498. For an interesting discussion of air transporation from its beginnings to modern times, see generally C. SOLBERG, CONQUEST OF
THE SKIES (1979). See also Wright, The Warsaw Conventions'DamageLimitation, 6 CLEV.MAR. L. REv. 290 (1957).
See C. SOLBERG, supra note 3, at 125, 225. Generally, air travel was limited by the
range of available aircraft (speed, size and distance between refueling). Technology in
the area of radar and other navigational equipment was also limited. Id
See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 498; Comment, supra note 1, at 809.
Haskell, supra note 1, at 485. The author states: "President Roosevelt submitted
The Treaty to the . . . Senate. On June 15, 1934 the Senate gave its advice and consent . . . . Roosevelt proclaimed adherence to the Treaty in October 1934." Id, cited
also in Comment, supra note 1, at 811. The Warsaw Convention today, with minor
exceptions, remains substantially the same. Air carriers in the United States, pursuant
to a private industry-wide agreement, now permit additional compensation to the liability limits under the Convention. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 596601. For a thorough discussion of the various amendments and protocols to the Warsaw Convention, see Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 498-509, 552-75; Comment, supra note 1, at 809. See also Comment, Limitations, supra note 2, at 11. Since
numerous articles containing excellent histories of the Warsaw Convention are widely
available, this comment will not concern itself with a detailed account of the treaty's
evolution. See S. SPEISER & C. KRAUSE, AVIATION TORT LAW § 11:4 (1978); Hildred,
Air Carrier's Liability.- Signiftance of the Warsaw Convention and Events Leading Up to the
Montreal Agreement, 33 J. AIR L. & CoM. 521 (1967); Comment, From Warsaw to Tenerife.-

1984]

COMMENTS

909

dustry benefited from the liability-limiting protection of the
Warsaw Convention. Increases in passenger miles traveled
spawned a demand for aircraft more advanced technologically.7 Optimism by lenders and investors led to an influx of
much-needed capital.8 Consequently, today's airline industry
boasts an impressive safety record 9 which in turn has increased the availability of low cost liability insurance.1 0 Because the airline industry in the United States is now a large
and financially secure industry, the accepted reason for
adopting the Convention's liability limitations has been
largely achieved."1 Moreover, the major concession made by
A ChronologicalAnalysis of the Liability Limitations Imposed Pursuant to the Warsaw Convention,
45 J. AIR L. & CoM. 653 (1980).
1 In 1980, approximately 747 million passengers boarded commercial aircraft.
INT'L AIR TRANS. Assoc., INDUS. RESEARCH Div. WORLD AIR TRANSPORT STATIS-

TICS 24 (1980), quoted in N. TANEJA, AIRLINES IN TRANSITION 28 (1981).

a Industry-wide statistics for 1981 numbered the worldwide fleet of commercial jet
aircraft at 6,085. 1982-83 AEROSPACE INDUS. Assoc. OF AMERICA AEROSPACE FACTS

& FIGURES 80 (1983). Total passenger miles flown by the world's commercial carriers
in 1980 totaled 679 billion miles. Id. at 79. Total world-wide passenger miles in 1935
were a mere 46.7 million. Burdell v. Canadian Pac. Airlines, 10 Av. Cas. (CCH)
18,151, 18,155 (1968) (citing Aero Publishers, 1968 AEROSPACE FACTS AND FIGURES
105 (1969)).
, Statistics for 1974 show a fatality rate of 13 per 100 million passenger miles flown
on U.S. domestic flights. See R. KAN & A. VOS, AIR TRANSPORTATION 8-11 (6th ed.

1975). During the original Paris conferences in 1925 and 1929 the average fatality rate
for domestic and international air carriers was 45 per 100 million passenger miles. See
Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 498.
- For estimates of the cost of this type of insurance see Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn,
supra note 3, at 556. See Burdell v. Canadian Pac. Airlines, 10 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,151,
18,159-60 (1968) (citing Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn), in which the court states:
Allowing for a reasonable margin of error in what were conceded to be
only estimates, the incremental insurance costs at various limits, taken as
a proportion of operating cost, were clearly somewhere between the cost
of the olive and the cost of the gin in the martini, and nowhere near the
cost of an inflight movie.
Id See also Brise, Some Thoughts on the Economic Sgniftance of Limited Liability in Air Passenger Transport, in ESSAYS IN AIR LAW 19, 22-23 (A. Kean ed. 11 1982).
" Attached to the treaty when it was submitted to the Senate for ratification was a
letter from then Secretary of State Cordell Hull, which stated:
It is believed that the principle of limitation of liability will not only be
beneficial to passengers and shippers as affording a more definite basis of
recovery and as tending to lessen litigation, but that it will prove to be
an aid in the development of international air transportation, as such
limitation will afford the carrier a more definite and equitable basis on
which to obtain insurance rates, with the probable result that there
would eventually be a reduction of operating expenses for the carrier
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air carriers under the treaty, a presumption of airline fault,"
is arguably of little value in this country considering the
widespread use of res ibsa loquitur by plaintiffs in aviation
crash litigation.' 3 Thus, courts today are faced with the unsavory task of enforcing a treaty provision that severely restricts
the rights of injured citizens to receive full compensation
without giving anything meaningful in return. 4
The Senate recently expressed its disfavor towards the recovery limits under the treaty when it rejected the Montreal
Protocol.' 5 The Protocol, which was negotiated by the State
Department in 1975, was designed to increase recoveries
available to accident victims, up to an absolute ceiling on reand advantages to travelers and shippers in the way of reduced transportion charges.
S. ExEc. Doc. No. G., 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1934), cied in In re Aircrash in Bali,
Indonesia on April 22, 1974, 684 F.2d 1301, 1307 (9th Cir. 1982). Though the Senate
consented to the treaty without actual debate, 78 CONG. REC. 11,582 (1934), it seems
that Secretary Hull's letter embodied the Senate's views on the need for the Warsaw
Convention in 1934. It goes without saying that travelers and shippers today feel no
gratitude in knowing that their rights to just compensation are severely restricted by
the treaty. See Loggans, Personal Injury Damages In InternationalAviation Litigation." The
Plainti'sPerspective, 13 J. MAR. L. REV. 541, 560 (1980).
12 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1,art. 17. Article 17 states:
The Carrier shall be liable for damages sustained in the event of the
death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by
a passenger, if the accident which caused the damages so sustained took
place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations or
embarking or disembarking.
Id. The presumption may be rebutted if the carrier can show that every necessary
precaution needed to prevent the accident was taken or that such precautions were
impossible. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 20.
The accepted definition of res ipsa loquitur states:
There must be reasonable evidence of negligence; but where the thing is
shown to be under the management of defendant or his servants, and the
accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if
those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendants, that the accident arose from want of care.
In Scott v. London & St. Katherine Docks Co., 159 Eng. Rep. 665 (1865) cited in W.
PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 213-14 n.76 (4th ed. 1971). For a discussion of the
doctrine as it applies to aviation accidents see W. PROSSER, supra, at 216 & nn.7-8.
' See infra text accompanying notes 19-22.
I,See generally Comment, supra note 1, at 809. Most recently the Senate defeated an
amendment to the treaty that would have raised airline liability to at least $117,000
per victim and would also have created a supplemental compensation plan. 129
CONG. REc. S2279 (daily ed. March 8, 1983).
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covery of $320,000 per passenger.' 6 Although the Senate Foreign Relations Committee recommended ratification,' 7 the
Protocol failed to gain two-thirds support on the Senate
floor.'8
The inadequacies and inequities of the Warsaw Convention have led courts in this country to scrutinize the treaty
with a jaundiced eye whenever its limitation on liability is
asserted. Judicial attacks on the Warsaw Convention can be
divided into four distinct categories: (1) constitutional challenges to the treaty; '9 (2) challenges asserting that the treaty
violates statutory property rights; 20 (3) challenges based on
the inadequacy of notice to passengers that the Convention
applies (ticketing requirements); 2 1 and (4) questions surrounding the proper method of converting judgments based
on a gold standard into dollars.22
Considering the refusal of Congress to reject article 22 of
the Warsaw Convention or to amend the limitation provisions to permit higher recoveries, 23 it can be persuasively argued that the time is right for the courts to examine the
constitutionality of the Warsaw liability limitations. This
comment will focus on challenges to the Warsaw Convention
under the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution, as well as under the implied constitutional right
6 See Comment, supra note 1, at 813.
,I Hearingson the Aviation ProtocolsBefore the Committee on Foreign Relations, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. 62 (1981); 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 59-61 (1977).
Is See supra note 15.
,9 See iqfta notes 61-91. See also Comment, supra note 1, at 817; McGilchrist, Can The
U.S Courts Denounce the Warsaw Convention?, 6 L.M.C.L.A. 111 (1982).
- See infra text accompanying notes 73-82. The Ninth Circuit recently questioned
whether article 22 of the Warsaw Convention may constitute a taking of due process
rights under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1941 (1976). See In re Aircrash in Bali Indonesia on April 22, 1974, 684 F.2d 1301, 1310 (9th Cir. 1982). For an in depth analysis of
the taking issue raised in Bali, see Comment, After Bali? Can the Warsaw Convention Be
Proven a Taking Under the Fith Amendment, 49 J. AIR L. & COM. 947 (1984).
2, See Comment, supra note 2, at 826.
22 See Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, 690 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1982)
(holding that the lack of an official conversion formula makes liability limitations in
Warsaw Convention unenforceable), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 1776 (1984); see also Comment,
supra note 1, at 830.
23 See supra note 15.
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to travel. 24 Generally, the standards of judicial review used
in due process and equal protection analysis are very deferential to legislative wisdom. 5 In cases involving restrictions of
travel rights, however, the courts will usually scrutinize such
restrictions under the first amendment.2 6 International
travel, on the other hand, has not been as strictly protected
by the courts as domestic travel.2 7 In essence, this treatment
seems to reveal that a court would likely use a low level of
judicial scrutiny to determine whether article 22 of the treaty
violates due process, equal protection and travel rights.
I.

CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF THE WARSAW

CONVENTION

From a United States constitutional perspective, the War28
saw Convention is a self-executing commercial treaty.
Although the Constitution expressly gives the legislative
branch the power to regulate international commerce, 29 a
self-executing treaty does not require any legislation to implement its provisions.3 The Constitution does require that the
President submit all treaties to the Senate for two-thirds approval.3 Thus, the constitutional roles of the Senate and the
President work in tandem in the ratification of a treaty.
The Warsaw Convention is an international agreement,
and accordingly, it involves foreign relations. Traditionally,
21 See infra notes 102-256 and accompanying text.
25 See in/a text accompanying notes 95, 102.
1i See infra note 174.
27 See infa text accompanying notes 179-180.
" See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 498. The treaty regulates U.S. carriers in ticketing procedures and also limits carriers' liability in international accidents.
Id at 498-99. A self-executing treaty is "immediately effective without the necessity of
ancillary legislation" to effect its purposes. See Se/f-executing constitutional provrion,

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1220 (5th ed. 1979).
2qU.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2 states: "Congress shall have power . . . to regulate
Commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
tribes." See in/fa note 40.
"' See supra note 28.

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 states: "[The President] shall have Power, by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of
the Senators present concur . ... "
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this area of responsibility has been vested in the President? 2
The power of the President in the realm of foreign policy has
been described by the Supreme Court as "delicate, plenary
and exclusive." ' 33 Once the Convention was approved by the
Warsaw Conference participants, the President endorsed the
treaty and submitted it to the Senate for approval. 4 The
Senate approved the treaty without debate in 1934." 5
Congress (through the Senate) exercised its enumerated

power to regulate international commerce when it approved
the Warsaw Convention. 36 No court, federal or state, has
challenged the authority of Congress to make the United

States Government a party to the Convention. Legislative
power over foreign trade is very broad.3 ' History suggests
that the constitutional framers intended for the legislative

branch to wield plenary power in the regulation of international commerce.3 8 The Warsaw Convention was devised
and adopted to promote foreign commerce. Congress properly exercised its commerce power when it approved the
treaty. 9 It is equally undisputed that both the President and
the Senate satisfied the treaty-making procedure prescribed

in Article II, Section 2(2) of the U.S. Constitution. 4°
.2

See

J.

NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 190 (2d ed.

1983) [hereinafter cited as CONSTITUTIONAL LAW].
.3 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
- See Haskell, supra note 1, at 485. President Roosevelt submitted the treaty to the
Senate in 1934. Id
3 Id. The treaty was ratified on June 15, 1934 and adhered to by the United States
in October, 1934. Id.
-6 Ratification of the Warsaw Convention by the Senate evidenced congressional
approval. Ratification provides an important legislative check to executive treatymaking power. Only one House, however, is enabled to assert this power. See infra note
40.
37 In fact, Supreme Court cases addressing commerce clause issues have essentially
focused on whether Congress' power to regulate interstateand intrastate commerce is as
great as its power to regulate foreign commerce. See, e.g., Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321
(1903) (Docket title - Champion v. Ames, No. 2, Francis v. United States, No. 80,
argued simultaneously).
-

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, s pra note 32, at 139.

See Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Pan Am. Airways, 58 F. Supp. 338, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1944)
(holding that the treaty-making provisions were followed in the adoption of the
Convention).
- See In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia on April 22, 1974, 684 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir.
1982). The plaintiffs argued that the treaty was never ratified by the Senate, but the
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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF TREATIES

It is a settled principle of judicial review that courts possess
the power to test the constitutionality of treaties. 4 1 Though
the Constitution does not specifically confer this right on the
judicial branch, scholars and judges agree that the broad concept of judicial review includes the substantive review of treaties.42 Treaties, being subject to constitutional scrutiny by
courts, are theoretically afforded no greater weight as law
than federal or state statutes.43 Consequently, a treaty may
not abridge liberties guaranteed citizens under the Constitu-

tion. Justice Story once said: "A power given by the Constitution cannot be construed to authorize a destruction of other
powers given in the same instrument. 44 Even though the
courts have declared themselves competent to determine the
constitutionality of treaties, none has ever exercised that
court rejected the argument, citing the Congressional Record account of the Senate's
consent. Id at 1307 n.5. For a transcript of the ratification, see 78 CONG. REC. 11,582
(1934). All statutes affecting international commerce must gain approval from both
Houses of Congress. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl.2 & cl.3. On the other hand, a treaty
entered into by the President must gain the two-thirds consent of the Senate alone. Id
art. II, cl.2; see supra note 31. There is an apparent overlap of executive and legislative
power when a purely economic treaty such as the Warsaw Convention is involved.
The President can negotiate and sign an international commercial agreement, and
with Senate "approval, such" an agreement is valid notwithstanding the House of
Representatives' constitutional article 1 power to approve commercial regulations. See
Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Pan Am. Airways, 58 F. Supp. 338, 339-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1944) (raising the issue of overlapping authority). During the constitutional convention a proposal was made that would have required both the House and Senate to approve all
treaties. 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at

457-59, 461-66 (rev. ed. 1937), cited in 2 M.

GLENNON & T. FRANK, UNITED STATES
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: DOCUMENTS AND SOURCES 342 (1980).

" In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia on April 22, 1974, 684 F.2d 1301, 1308-09 (9th
Cir. 1982); Burdell v. Canadian Pac. Airlines, 10 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,151 (Ill. Cir. Ct.
1968). See also W. COWELS, TREATIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PROPERTY AND
DUE PROCESS OF LAW (1941).
-1 See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 32, at 201-11. This view prevails notwithstanding the language in the Constitution which states that: "[All treaties made...
under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the Land; and
the Judges in every state shall be bound thereby .... " U. S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
4:,
There is no question that treaties are superior to and preempt state laws. In terms
of judicial review, however, a treaty is not considered to be above constitutional restraint. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1957).
44

2 J.

STORY,

COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 1508 (3d ed. 1958), cited in Burdell v. Canadian Pac. Airlines, 10 Av. Cas. (CCH)
18,151, 18,156 (II1.Cir. Ct. 1968).
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power.

Historically, the Supreme Court has declined to use its review power in matters touching foreign policy or national security." The courts have also been deferential to questions
involving international commerce.4 This refusal to assert judicial power is known as the political question doctrine.4 8
The doctrine is rooted in the premise that the courts are the
least suited of the three branches to decide issues affecting
this nation's policies and relations with the rest of the world.4 9
Supreme Court opinions on the subject are few in number
and do not provide a clear picture of the doctrine.5 °
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 32, at 202.

See generally Nowak & Young, 4 Comment on the Creation and Resolution of a "Nonproblem "; Dames & Moore v. Regan, The Foreign Affairs Power, andthe Role of the Court, 29
UCLA L. REV. 1129 (1982). See also A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 184
(1962); CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 32, at 119 n.90; Henkin, Is There a "Pohlical
Question" Doctrnhe?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 622-23 (1976).
, See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 32, at 139.
See id at 109.
49 Id at 109, 197-98. The political question doctrine is not limited to foreign affairs.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208-11 (1962). The Constitution expressly grants to the
Supreme Court jurisdiction over all (1) disputes involving treaties, ambassadors and
other diplomats, (2) disputes between the United States and other countries, and
(3) disputes between United States citizens and foreign citizens and governments. U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2. See also Scharpf, JudicialReview and the Pohtal Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517, 567 (1966).
11 Early Supreme Court decisions reflect the Court's uncertainty as to its role in the
scheme of foreign affairs. See Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890) (Court refused to
question a treaty that permitted foreign nationals to inherit in this country). The
Court in Geofroy held that the treaty-making power was subject to constitutional restraint, but it refused to question the subject matter of any treaty that did not limit
state power under the tenth amendment. Id at 272-73. See also Missouri v. Holland,
252 U.S. 416 (1920) (holding that a treaty with Great Britain to protect migratory
birds did not overstep states' rights under the tenth amendment); United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (upholding an executive proclamation banning sale of arms to certain countries). In Missouri . Holland,Justice Holmes
held that "Acts of Congress are the supreme law of the land only when made in pursuance of the Constitution, while treaties are declared to be so when made under the
authority of the United States." 252 U.S. at 433. See L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND THE CONSTITUTION 147 (1972); Nowak & Young, supra note 46, at 1140. The
Court clarified its position in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). The Court held that
the U.S. Military had no court martial jurisdiction over civilian relatives of military
personnel stationed abroad under a U.S./Great Britain treaty. 354 U.S. at 39-41.
Writing for the plurality, Justice Black firmly declared the judiciary's power to determine whether a treaty violates the Bill of Rights. Id. at 16-17. The power of the judicial branch to second-guess executive and legislative acts was further established in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). In Youngstown, the
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In Baker v. Carr,5t a case involving court-ordered legislative
reapportionment, the Supreme Court dismissed a longstanding notion that treaties were immune from judicial review.52
Supreme Court struck down President Truman's attempt to seize the nation's steel
mills during a strike that occured in the midst of the Korean conflict. Id at 588. The
Court acknowledged the importance of judicial deference in matters touching on foreign affairs where both the President and Congress act jointly, but the Court established its right to scrutinize actions taken by the President alone without congressional
approval or delegation of authority. Id Under the test laid out by the Court, where
both Congress and the President have endorsed a particular action, the Court should
review the action only to see if clear abuses of federal power are present. Id at 585.
Justice Jackson in his concurring opinion set forth three types of presidential action
and the levels of judicial scrutiny applicable to each:
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maxiumum, for it includes all that
he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate. . . . A
Seizure executed by the President pursuant to an Act of Congress would
be supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of
judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily
upon any who might attack it.
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or
denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers. . . . In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the
imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on
abstract theories of law.
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the express or
implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb . . .[and] must
be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system.
Id at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring). Since Youngstown, the Supreme Court has not
confronted the President or Congress in a case involving foreign relations. Very recently, in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), the Court upheld President
Carter's agreement with Iran, under which the United States released Iranian assets in
return for the release of U.S. citizens who were being held hostage. Since Congress had
implicitly consented to the agreement, Justice Rehnquist followed the test set forth by
Justice Jackson in Youngstown by giving the hostage-release agreement the "stongest
presumption" of constitutionality. Id at 661, 668, 686. The opinion evidences the
Court's attitude of utmost deference in sensitive international negotiations. Id at 68283. The Dames & Moore opinion did leave open the possibility of judicial scrutiny if a
treaty or other agreement were to restrict first amendment liberties. Id at 688. However, some commentators claim that the Supreme Court refused to prevent even the
infringement of first amendment rights in the 1982 case of Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280
(1981). Phillip Agee, an ex-CIA employee, had his passport revoked when he attempted to travel overseas to expose CIA operatives. Id at 283-86. Citing the sensitivity of the subject matter (foreign intelligence) and the danger to U.S. citizens abroad,
the Supreme Court upheld the State Department's revocation of Agee's passport without considering whether Agee's rights of free speech and association were violated. Id
at 292, 306.
. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
.2 Id at 211. The Court did recognize the need for a unified voice in matters of
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The Court stated that "it is error to suppose that every case
or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond the
judicial cognizance. 5 3 Other portions of the Baker opinion,
however, make it clear that judicial standards are frequently
inapplicable to issues involving foreign policy,54 and that the
judicial branch should defer to the President's broad foreign
affairs power in most cases in order to preserve a unified federal voice abroad. 5
The President's endorsement of and adherence to the Warsaw Convention was within the international affairs power
historically relegated to the executive branch.56 Additionally,
the Senate's approval and ratification of the treaty was carried out in a constitutional manner. 57 Though the Supreme
Court has never used its review power to invalidate a treaty,
it has carefully preserved the power to do so if deemed necessary.5" To date, the courts have used the utmost restraint in
foreign policy matters.5 9 Even so, judicial review of article 22
cannot be ruled out. The constitutionality of the Warsaw
limitations has been challenged by plaintiffs in several cases."
III.

DECISIONS ADDRESSING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
THE WARSAW CONVENTION

Plaintiffs have confronted several courts with constitutional attacks leveled at the liability limitations of the Warsaw Convention.6 In the few cases in which lower courts
foreign policy. Id Consequently, the fact that a legislative or executive act concerns
foreign policy is important with respect to judicial review, but it does not require a
court to refuse to hear the case. Id
I

Id.

SId.

See supra text accompanying notes 28-40.
supra text accompanying notes 28-40.
M See supra text accompanying notes 41-45.
.9See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
- See infra notes 61, 62. See also In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia on April 22, 1974,
684 F.2d 1301, 1309 (9th Cir. 1982).
s'See Molitch v. Irish Int'l Airlines, 436 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1970) (holding that failure
to raise constitutional challenge at trial waived plaintiff's right to raise same on appeal); In re Pago Pago Aircrash of January 30, 1974, 419 F. Supp. 1158 (C.D. Cal.
1976) (court denying motions raising constitutionality issue pending jury determina' See
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have considered the constitutionality of article 22, most have
dismissed the plaintiffs' arguments in a cursory manner.62
Not until the late 1960s, over thirty years after the treaty was
ratified, did a court thoroughly consider and analyze the legitimate question of whether the Warsaw limitations were
constitutional.
Burdell v. CanadianPaciftc Airhie 6 3 arose out of an air crash
that occurred during an airliner's final approach into Tokyo,
Japan through heavy fog. 64 The critical issue in Burdell was
the applicability of the Warsaw Convention to the suit filed
against Canadian Pacific Airlines by the families of the accident victims. 65 Ultimately, the Illinois circuit court declared
the treaty to be inapplicable to the suit. 66 In dicta, however,
the circuit court tackled head-on the constitutionality of article 22.67 The court, noting the vastly improved safety record
of the airline industry, the financial strength of air carriers
and the low cost of liability insurance, concluded that the liability limitations were "arbitrary, irresponsible, capricious
and indefensible. '" 68 Citing a number of authorities supporting judicial review of treaties, the court stated that article 22
tion of willful misconduct issue); Eck v. United Arab Airlines, 15 N.Y.2d 53, 203
N.E.2d 640, 225 N.Y.S.2d 149 (1964) (plaintiff prevailed on other grounds), cited in
Comment, supra note 1, at 807, 818 n.80.
62 See Pierre v. Eastern Air Lines, 152 F. Supp. 486 (D.N.J. 1957) (holding that the
Warsaw Convention does not unfairly deprive a claimant of complete trial by jury
because determination of damages is not solely a jury function); Indemnity Ins. Co. v.
Pan Am. Airways, 58 F. Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1944) (holding that historical uniformity
in commercial treaty-making requires judicial deference and furthermore, that the
treaty does not violate due process because other laws also limit liability); Garcia v.
Pan Am. Airways, 183 Misc. 258,50 N.Y.S.2d 250 (1944), afdpercuriam, 295 N.Y. 852,
67 N.E.2d 257 (1946) (constitutionality argument dismissed without discussion of
either nature or merit of the challenge on grounds that a treaty of such importance as
the Warsaw Convention is presumed to be constitutional unless an appellate court
declares otherwise).
63 10 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,151 (Ill.
Cir. Ct. 1968), revised, 11 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,351
(Ill. Cir. Ct. 1969).
- See Kennelly, Response to Comments on Burdell v. Canadian Pacific Airlines, 58 ILL.
B.J. 454 (1970).
- 10 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,151.
- Id at 18,155. The court held that Singapore (where the flight to Tokyo
originated) had not adopted the Warsaw Convention. Id
67

Id

-,Id at 18,157-61.
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of the treaty was wholly irrational, served no reasonable purpose and, as a result, violated the plaintiffs' rights to due process. 69 Furthermore, because the court stated that the special
treatment afforded the airline industry constituted a classification serving no legitimate state interest, the equal protection rights of other industries were also violated.7" The
portion of the opinion addressing the constitutional issues was
later excised at the request of the defendant. 7 ' Burdell, while
praised by at least one commentator, remained largely unno72
ticed for another thirteen years.
The constitutional arguments set forth in Burdell resurfaced
in the 1982 case, In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia on April 11,
1974,13 in which the Ninth Circuit reopened the door to constitutional scrutiny of the Warsaw liability limitations. The
case grew out of the crash of a Pan American Airways 707
into a mountainside which occurred after the plane's crew
lost visual contact with the airport's runway lights. Survivors
of three passengers brought an action at state law for damages against the defendant Pan American Airways.7 4 In turn,
Pan American relied on article 22 of the Warsaw Convention
to limit its liability. 75 The district court found that the liability limitation was not applicable. 76 Pan Am, therefore, appealed. 77 The plaintiffs cross-appealed alleging, among other
things, that the treaty violated their rights of substantive due
process and equal protection. 78 They also argued that the
limitation provisions of the treaty amounted to an impermissible travel restriction.79
The Ninth Circuit carefully side-stepped the plaintiffs' con69

Id

70 Id

at 18,161.

Cir. Ct. 1969).
, See 11 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,351, 17,354 (Ill.
72See Kennelly, supra note 64, at 454-64. Cf Hay, Comments on Burdell v. Canadian
Pacifw Airlines and the Constitutionality of the Warsaw Convention, 58 ILL. B.J. 26 (1969).
". 684 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982).
7- In re Air Crash in Bali, Indonesia, 462 F. Supp. 1114, 1116-17 (C.D. Cal. 1978),
rev'd, 684 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982).
- Id at 1117.
76 Id. at 1124.
"' 684 F.2d at 1304.
7

Id at 1309.

1: Id
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stitutional arguments by instead questioning, sua sponle,
whether the Convention's liability limitation was a taking of
the plaintiffs' property (their right of action at state law)
under the fifth amendment.8 0 The court concluded that the
plaintiffs' constitutional arguments would fail if full compensation for the taking could be recovered in the United States
Claims Court. 8 ' The court, however, carefully avoided holding that limitation of a right of action at state law under the
treaty did amount to a taking under the fifth amendment,
holding only that the claims court has jurisdiction to hear
such a taking claim.82
In dicta, the Ninth Circuit went on to address the merits of
the plaintiffs' constitutional arguments.8 3 As in Burdell, the
court had little difficulty determining that the Warsaw Convention, like any other treaty, is not shielded from review.8 4
The court then proceeded to summarize the growth of the
airline industry and the availability of low-cost liability insurance.8 5 Using the lowest form of judicial scrutiny - whether
a law is reasonable or arbitrary8 6 _ the court indicated that
article 22 of the Convention might be unconstitutional because it burdens due process and equal protection rights
8 Id at 1310.
8
Id The jurisdictional statute of the Claims Court provides in relevant part that:
The Claims Court shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any
claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or
any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or
upon any express or implied contract with the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1982). For an analysis of the taking question, see Comment, supra
note 20, at 967-85 (1984).
The court was able to avoid the constitutional issues by re82 684 F.2d at 1313.
manding the case to the district court for certain findings of fact. Id After a determination of damages the plaintiffs would presumably be able to file suit in the Claims
Court on a taking theory if the damages awarded exceeded the maximum recoverable
damages under article 22 of the Warsaw Convention. Id
Id at 1308.
* Id at 1308-09.
8I

Id

at 1310.

" Id at 1309. The court indicated that the appropriate standard of review in a
challenge to the Convention under the Constitution would be the test laid out in Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978). Under this standard
an economic regulation is constitutional unless it is arbitrary or unreasonable. 684
F.2d at 1309.
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without serving any meaningful purpose.8 7
In addition, the court endorsed the plaintiffs' argument
that the Warsaw limitation was essentially a penalty imposed
88
on citizens who wish to travel outside the United States.
The court stated that the right to travel freely outside the
United States is a fundamental right that can be abridged
only to serve a substantial governmental aim.8 9 The court
of fundamental liberties must be
also noted that a restriction
"carefully tailored."'
A potential hurdle to a right to travel
argument in wrongful death actions, recognized by the court,
is whether relatives of air crash victims have standing to allege infringement of crash victims' personal liberties. 9
While there exists only a skeletal framework of case law
dealing with constitutionality of the treaty's limitation provisions, the courts agree that they possess the power to scrutinize the treaty should review become necessary.9 2 Judicial
distaste for the Warsaw limitations has continued to grow.9 3
Time and changed circumstances have sharpened the harsh
effects of article 22 on citizens. Hence, the justification for its
continued survival should be questioned in a constitutional
light.
DOES ARTICLE 22 OF THE CONVENTION VIOLATE
DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS?

IV.

Due process and equal protection challenges require essentially the same type of judicial analysis. The distinction lies
in an additional element in the equal protection analysis:

a, 684 F.2d at 1309-10. The court stated: "We conclude that plaintiff's due process
and right-to-travel arguments, while substantial, would fail if another remedy were
available that would provide them with full compensation. We find that such a remedy is available [in the Claims Court]." Id at 1310. See supra note 81.
684 F.2d at 1309.
0 id
- Id Compare infta notes 202-205 and accompanying text.
9,684 F.2d at 1310.
w See supra notes 61, 62.
9 Ste generally Comment, supra note 1, at 809. Most recently the Senate defeated an

amendment to the treaty that would have raised airline liability to at least $117,000
per victim and would also have created a supplemental compensation plan. 129
CONG. REc. S2279 (daily ed. March 8, 1983).
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when a plaintiff alleges that his rights to equal protection
have been violated, he must show that an identifiable group
of persons, of which he is a member, has been singled out and
treated unfairly by a law. 94 Due process analysis does not require invidious discrimination against distinct groups, yet
most due process challenges involve some type of classification as well.95 The merits of challenges to the limitation provisions of the Warsaw Convention under the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Constitution will be discussed
separately. It must be noted, however, that these two constitutional arguments overlap to a great extent.
A.

Substantive Due Process

Judicial review of the substantive fairness of a federal,
state or local law is a much broader exercise of judicial power
than the determination of whether a law satisfies procedural
due process requirements. 96 Both types of due process are derived from the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments. 97 Procedural due process is concerned with the
more limited requirement that the decision-making process
behind a law be fair, not whether the effects of the law are
fair.9 8 As stated earlier, the procedure followed by the President and the Senate in the adoption of the Warsaw Convention was constitutional. 9 The due process arguments raised
in Bah and Burdell were based on substantive due process.' °°
When a court reviews a law on substantive due process
grounds, it dissects the law to see if individual liberties are
- Id
9s

CONSTITUTIONAL LAw,

supra note 32, at 585-90.

Id.

- Id. at 416-17.
9' The fifth amendment provides in part that: "No person shall ... be deprived of
life, liberty or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The
fourteenth amendment provides in part that: "[N]o State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunites of citizens of the United States,
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
- CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, .upra note 32, at 416-17.

- See supra text accompanying note 40.
1- 684 F.2d at 1309; 10 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 18,157-61.
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improperly burdened. 101
Under the current judicial standard of substantive due process review, a law must be rationally related to a legitimate
state interest. 10 2 This test of substantive fairness gives utmost
deference to legislative acts.10 3 Supreme Court decisions,
however, have created heightened levels of review where certain fundamental liberties such as speech, religion and travel
rights are restricted by a law or regulation.10 4 When one of
,S0
ee, e.g., 10 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 18,157-6 1. See also New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal.
v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978) (court distinguished substantive from procedural due process).
,02 For a thorough discussion of the development of substantive due process, see
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, srupra note 32, at 425-51. Early Supreme Court decisions expressed a hesitancy to examine the substantive constitutionality of a Congressional act.
See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798) (first Supreme Court decision to consider
the concept of substantive review). In CalderJustice Iredell established the principle of
judicial restraint, stating that the courts should not overturn legislation that violates
natural law unless such judicial power can be derived from express constitutional language. Id at 398-400. In 1877, the Court, in Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887),
decided that the judiciary had a duty to examine law substantively to determine if
police power was being used to protect public health, safety and morals. Id.at 660-61.
In the early Twentieth Century the Court entered a more liberal era during which
many state and federal laws affecting economic affairs were scrutinized and overturned
on the basis of underlying unfairness. The most famous of these cases was Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The Court in Lochner struck down a New York Law
which limited the hours per week that bakers could work. Though New York asserted
a health and safety rationale for the statute, the Court held that the law restricted the
rights of employees and employers to contract freely with one another. Id at 64. For a
detailed analysis of this case and its progeny, see CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, srupra note 32
at 436-43. See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 421-53 (1978). This
period, referred to as the "Lochner" era, continued until the late 1930's. In the case of
United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), the Court expressed disenchantment with the results of its broad use of the due process clause and adopted a
more deferential test much like the Court's early public health, safety and morals standard. Id at 154. Justice Stone, writing for the majority, held that "[in] inquiries where
the legislative judgment is drawn in question, [the Court] must be restricted to the
issue whether any state of facts either known or which could reasonably be assumed
affords support for it." Id See also CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, supra note 32, at 444 (citing
R. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 182-85 (1960)); L. TRIBE, supra, at

450. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) (upholding Kansas statute
prohibiting practice of debt adjusting). See also CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, supra note 32,
at 418. Under the standard of review used in Carolene Products a law must be rationally
related to a legitimate state interest. For a judicial pronouncement of the means-end
test see Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 536-37 (1934). Once the means-end test is
satisfied, a court will not attempt to second guess legislative or executive wisdom. Ferguson, 372 U.S. at 731.
See, e.g., Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 14 (1976).
,o United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152. Justice Stone, in his
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these rights is abridged, the Government must show that the
relevant law is "substantially related" to a "compelling" state
objective.,o 5
The Supreme Court recently addressed the constitutional
fairness of a federal statute that limits tort recoveries in much
0 6
the same manner as article 22 of the Warsaw Convention.1
07

Duke Power Co. v. Carolna Envtl. Study Group, Inc.'

involved an

economic regulation similar in purpose to the limitation provisions of the treaty. In order to encourage capital investment in the nuclear power industry, Congress passed the
Price-Anderson Act, a statute that limits liability resulting
from a single nuclear accident to $560 million.'0 8 The plaintiffs resided near several proposed nuclear power plants. 0 9
They argued that the limitation on liability under the Act
violated their due process rights."' The Supreme Court employed the traditional low-level standard of reveiw, rejecting
the plaintiffs' argument that a higher level of scrutiny is warfamous footnote, stated: "There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments." Id at 152
n.4. For an exhaustive discussion of fundamental rights, see CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
supra note 32, at 457. The Supreme Court has pronounced a "strict scrutiny" equal
protection standard in cases where fundamental liberties are involved. The authors of
a leading treatise on U.S. Constitutional law define fundamental rights as "rights
which the court recognizes as having a value so essential to individual liberty in our
society that they justify the Justices reviewing the acts of other branches of government
in a manner similar to the substantive due process approach of the pre-1937 period."
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 32, at 457. Certain other rights such as the right to
travel and right to privacy are implied from these stated liberties. See Crandall v.
Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867) (first Supreme Court case to imply constitutional
right to travel); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (establishing a zone of
privacy emanating from the Constitution which protects citizens from state
regulation).
See iqfra note 143.
... See infra text accompanying notes 107-113.
438 U.S. 59 (1978).
Price-Anderson Act, 71 Stat. 476, 42 U.S.C. § 1120 (1976). The Supreme Court
also noted that the Act was passed to protect the public as well. 438 U.S. at 64 (citing
42 U.S.C. § 1120(i) (1976)).
I-'. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 431
F. Supp. 203, 205 (W.D.N.C. 1977).
.... 438 U.S. at 83. The plaintiffs urged the Court to use a stricter standard of review
because the Price-Anderson Act "jeopardized" interests that were "far more important
than those in the economic due process and business-oriented cases." Id.
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ranted in cases where a commercial law restricts the rights of
injured citizens to receive full compensation.1 1 1 The Court
weighed the potential burden on victims of a nuclear mishap
against the important national interest in the development of
nuclear energy.1 12 On this basis, the Court held that the
Price-Anderson Act was a rational congressional exercise of
3
the commerce power. 11
The situation in Duke closely paralled that of the airline
industry in the 1930s and 1940s. 1 4 The Court in Duke
pointed out that liability coverage for nuclear accidents was
not available in amounts above the liability ceiling imposed
by the Price-Anderson Act.'' 5 The opinion stressed Congress'
legitimate interest in making the United States less dependent on foreign crude oil through economic stimulation of a
young and inexperienced nuclear power industry. 116 The
President and the Senate were likewise seeking to encourage a
developing airline industry when they endorsed and ratified
the liability limitations of the Warsaw Convention. "7 Today, however, the facts relied on by the Supreme Court in
Duke do not exist in regard to article 22 of the Convention. 1 "
The standard of review for a law regulating commerce is
essentially the same under the due process clause as it is
under the equal protection clause; a law must be a reasonable
means of achieving a legitimate government goal.11 9 The test
of legitimay focuses upon the reason for the governmental

restriction. 120
Id at 83-84.
,,2 Id at 84. The Court held that the $560 million ceiling on recoveries was carefully
arrived at by Congress in light of the uncertainty of damages that a nuclear disaster
would cause, the unlikelihood that such an accident would occur, and the probability
that Congress would enact emergency laws to supplement recoveries if necessary. Id at
85-93.
-1 Id at 82.
,,4 See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
1. 438 U.S. at 84-85.
"1 Id at 83.
117 See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
11R See supra notes 4-13 and accompanying text.
- See generally Karst, The Fifth Amendment's Guarantee of Equal Protection, 55 N.C.L.
REV. 540 (1977), cited in CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, supra note 32, at 585 n.6.
,- See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. at 83-84.
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When the treaty was adopted in 1934, the President and
the Senate were clearly acting for the benefit of a young and
fragile industry subject to substantial risks.1 2 1 The embryonic
technology and lack of experience in the design and operation of aircraft created safety and financial risks peculiar to
the airline industry. 22 The hazards of international air
travel, however, were offset by the benefits to be derived from3
12
a fast and relatively inexpensive mode of transportation.
Congress and the President knew that a strong network of
international air routes would strengthen the United States
both economically and politically. 1 24 Thus, at the time of its
ratification, the liability limitations under the Convention
served a legitimate government interest.
Gradually, over the past fifty years, the economic status of
the airline industry has improved. 125 The need for governmental protection, initially of critical importance, is no
longer as great. Arguably, however, the financial struggles
troubling many United States based carriers today as a result
of deregulation demonstrate a continuing need for special
treatment of the airline industry.' 26 In either event, the most
significant development in the airline industry is the willingness of insurance companies to insure flights at a nominal cost
to carriers. 27 The question that next arises is whether a previously legitimate treaty provision should continue to be upheld once its special protections are no longer needed.
The Supreme Court has held that in considering the effects
of a law, whether harmful or beneficial, courts should consider current and actual circumstances rather than those that
existed during another era.12 8 If the opposite were true, once
121
122

123
124

See supra note 3.
See, e.g., GIBBS-SMITH, THE AEROPLANE: A HISTORICAL SURVEY (1960).
Id.
See supra notes 3-6.

,2.See supra notes 7-10.
126 (d

,27See supra note 10.
,2R
Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 547 (1924). The Court, in reviewing a
rent control regulation enacted in the District of Columbia, held that "[a] law depending upon the existence of an emergency or other certain state of facts to uphold it may
cease to operate if the emergency ceases or the facts change even though valid when
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a statute or regulation were found to be constitutional, no
subsequent attempts could be made by a court to nullify latent, harmful effects. The courts in Bali and Burdell were not
troubled by the undisputed fact that at one time article 22 of
the treaty served a legitimate state function.129 Yet, economic
policy may not be the only reason for continued United
States adherence to the Warsaw liability limitations. A persuasive argument can be made that the Convention continues
to serve a vital and useful function in United States foreign

relations. 130
The Warsaw Convention is one of the most widely accepted international agreements in the world today.'' Over
the years it has fostered commercial relations between the
United States and many different countries. 112 It would be
difficult to say that United States foreign policy has not
benefitted, at least indirectly, from the Convention. The policy of a particular nation cannot be defined by a finite set of
guidelines and principles. 133 In the overall scheme of United
States foreign relations, the Warsaw limitations could, perhaps, represent a concession made by the Government in return for cooperation in other areas of commercial activity on
the part of other member nations.' 34 Additionally, some
commentators argue that neither the President nor Congress

should repeal any portion of a longstanding international
agreement because such an act would damage the credibility
of the United States abroad.
Political interests could also be affected by judicial abrogation of article 22 of the treaty. 1 35 United States foreign policy
passed." Id Cf Bali, 684 F.2d at 1308. The Ninth Circuit in Bali stated that it was
unaware of any doctrine that would not permit it to scrutinize the Warsaw Convention
to determine if the treaty still serves the purposes for which it was passed. Id
684 F.2d at 1307-08; 10 Av. Gas. (CCH) at 18,157-58.
'" See infra text accompanying notes 167-173.
Over ninety countries have adopted the Warsaw Convention. See L. KREINDLER,
AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW § 11.01[3] (1971).

~2Id

F. HARTMANN, THE RELATIONS OF NATIONS 71 (1962).
684 F.2d at 1310. The United States has argued that in its negotiations concerning international air travel, concessions such as limitation of liability are necessary to
foster cooperation by foreign countries. Id
15 Id.
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consists of a web of military, humanitarian and commercial
interests, all of which are closely intertwined. 136 For this reason, the courts may be ill-equipped to weigh the rights of
United States citizens to full compensation against the global
interests of this nation. In the past, the courts have chosen
not to address political issues of this nature."'
The President has not vigorously asserted any national
concern for upholding the current liability limits under the
Convention, although continued adherence to the treaty as a
whole has been advocated by the State Department.138 The
Senate, however, has expressed its unwillingness to adopt any
form of liability limitation under the Convention.t3 This apparent impasse between the executive and legislative
branches over the proper solution to the problem of inadequate recoveries under the treaty could signal a need for judicial intervention on a constitutional basis.
B.

Equal Protection

There are really two distinct equal protection clauses. The
first is found in the fourteenth amendment, and it applies to
state and local government. I' ° The second clause is implied
from the due process clause of the fifth amendment and it
applies to the federal government.

14 1

The major difference

between due process and equal protection review is that
under the latter there must also exist distinct classifications of
- C. FENWICK, FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 102 (1968).
,17See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
,- An interesting justification for the executive branch's failure to respond to the
burdensome effect of the treaty on citizens is a fear that such a move might cause
negative foreign policy reverberations. Compare the State Department's letter of intent
to denounce the Warsaw Convention of 1965. Haskell, supra note 1, at 486-87. The
denunciation was to have taken effect six months after its release. Subsequent collat-

eral agreements increasing maximum recoveries against U.S. carriers satisfied concern
over U.S. citizens' rights to full compensation and, accordingly, the denunciation was
withdrawn. Id.

See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
-" The fourteenth amendment provides in part: "No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall. . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
1'
See supra note 97 for the pertinent language of the fifth amendment.
139
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two or more groups of individuals.t4 2 The standard of review
under the equal protection clause, however, tracks the same
rational means-legitimate end analysis employed today by
the courts under the due process clause where laws affecting
143
commercial and social welfare are involved.
As stated by the courts in Bali, Burdell and Duke, an economic restriction of due process and equal protection requires
that a classification not be arbitrary.1 44 Assuming for the
purposes of this discussion that the Warsaw Convention
serves a legitimate government interest, the next step of review is to determine whether the method chosen to achieve
the desired result is rational.
From an equal protection standpoint the Warsaw Convention creates at least two classifications: (1) domestic versus
international air travelers and (2) international air carriers
versus all other industries. 145 The Warsaw Convention ap-

plies only to "international flights" as defined in article 1(2)
of the Convention. 46 Generally, an international flight is a
flight or series of flights originating in one member country
and terminating in another. 47 If a passenger is required to
link several connecting flights in order to arrive at a foreign
destination, the treaty is applicable even if a crash occurs
supra note 32, at 583-601.
A type of classification, the "suspect class," will trigger the highest degree of scrutiny. Id at 592. A suspect classification is one based on race or alienage. See Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (antimiscegenation statute held to violate equal protection
rights); see also Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (state welfare benefits could
not be conditioned on citizenship or residency requirements). Strict scrutiny ignores
normal policies of judicial deference and instead requires the state to show that the
classification is "substantially related" to a "compelling" state objective. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 32, at 722-31. During the 1970's several Supreme Court
decisions modified the language of the strict scrutiny standard. See 1d. Many scholars
and commentators have interpreted these opinions to mean that an "intermediate"
level of scrutiny will be used where "important" yet non-fundamental rights are infringed through classifications of citizens. For examples of intermediary scrutiny, see
Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979) (classification based on illegitimacy); Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (gender-based classification).
144 Bali, 684 F.2d at 1309; Burdell, 10 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 18,161; Duke Power,438 U.S.
at 83.
'. See Kennelly, supra note 64, at 458.
- Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(2).
147 1d,
142
14

CONSrrUTIONAL LAw,
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during a domestic leg of the journey.148 In theory, the definition makes sense and in fact the courts have not criticized the
foreign/domestic distinction. In reality, the definition can
lead to seemingly bizarre results.' 49 As an example, take a
flight from Boston to New York carrying two passengers; one
whose final destination is New York and another who must
change planes in New York to arrive at his destination in
Paris. If the plane crashes and both are killed, the family of
the New York resident will be entitled to full recovery while
the family of the passenger booked on a subsequent flight to
Paris will be limited in their recovery by article 22 of the
Warsaw Convention. This result becomes harsher when domestic flights between the mainland United States and Hawaii or Alaska are considered in that these routes are as
lengthy as most international routes. 150 Still, the distinction
cannot easily be labeled as unreasonable by design even
though specific results may often seem irrational. Critics of
the definition of international flights have not proposed any
alternative method for determining what flights should be
subject to the Convention.
The more difficult task is justifying the special economic
treatment of international air carriers apart from all other
industries.1 51 This analysis overlaps with the first prong of
52
low level scrutiny - the existence of a legitimate state end.1
The original purpose of article 22 of the Warsaw Convention
is no longer a persuasive argument. The court in Burdell
viewed the unnecessary protection of a financially solid industry as arbitrary and irrational.153 The fact that one industry is preferred over others by a law still does not, in and of
itself, support a finding of unconstitutionality,' 54 but governmental preference of one industry over all others simply to
further inarticulated foreign policy objectives hardly suggests
- Id. See also S. SPEISER & C. KRAUSE, supra note 10, at

§ 11.8.

, Kennelly, supra note 64, at 458.
I'
Id.
See Burdell, 10 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 18,160-61.
' See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
Burdell, 10 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 18,160.
' See Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
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a rational exercise of executive or legislative power.' 55 Still, it
must not be forgotten that in reviewing the treaty a court
would simply be looking for a conceivable rationale for the

classification. 156
In Duke, the Supreme Court easily found that a statutory
liability limitation for nuclear power companies was reasonable because of prohibitive financial risks that would have
otherwise prevented development of nuclear power plants. 157
In Burdell, the court was unable to find any reason for extending preferential treatment to a self-sufficient airline
industry. "'8
The rationality of the two classifications discussed previously under the second step in the equal protection analysis,
1 59
the means-legitimate end relationship, is also questionable.
If the only legitimate reason for limiting the recoveries of citizens harmed by negligent airline practices is founded in
broad foreign policy objectives, it becomes difficult to understand why United States citizens who wish to travel abroad
by air should be singled out to shoulder the burden of such a
policy. There is a growing trend among the courts of this
country towards full recovery for death and injury caused by
negligent and strictly liable defendants. 160 The liability limitations of the Warsaw Convention directly contravene this
6
trend.' '
From an opposite perspective, the treaty also places a dis-

"I

This view was suggested by the court in Burdell, 10 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,151,
18,160-61.
See supra note 143.
Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 85-86.
Burdell, 10 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 18,160.
For a discussion and analysis of low-level scrutiny in the context of substantive
due process, see supra notes 96-139 and accompanying text.
See Comment, supra note 1, at 808 (citing Kreindler, A Plaintifis VIew ofMontreal,

33 J. AIR L. & COM. 528 (1967)); Loggans, supra note 11, at 541.
.. See Loggans, supra note 11,at 541-42. See also Bali 684 F.2d at 1310. The Ninth

Circuit outlined several arguments against the treaty's constitutionality and then based
its holding on statutory grounds, i.e., the jurisdiction of the Claims Court. Id In
Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, 690 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S.
Ct. 1776 (1984), the Second Circuit approached the liability limitation problem indirectly, holding that Congress had not specified the appropriate conversion formula for
courts to use in translating "poincare" francs into dollars. 690 F.2d at 311.
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proportionate amount of air disaster liability on aircraft manufacturers, aircraft component part manufacturers, and the
United States Treasury. 6 2 One supporter of the Burdell dictum has pointed out that in virtually all aviation crash litigation the aircraft's manufacturer is named as a co-defendant
with the carrier. 163 In some cases the United States is joined
as co-defendant as well because of its role as the regulator of
air safety.'6 The biased treatment of air carriers under the
Warsaw Convention greatly burdens co-defendants in cases
where a manufacturer is found to be strictly liable and an
airline is found to have been negligent. ' 65 Though both parties are theoretically responsible for the accident, the manufacturer is forced to absorb most of the damages assessed. 166
Actions for contribution and indemnity are not available
against airlines by virtue of the treaty. 167 There being no evidence today that air carriers are any less able to bear responsibility for their acts of wrongdoing than are manufacturers,
the reasonableness of this effect is subject to question. It has
also been pointed out that in cases where both the government and the carrier are adjudged liable, the Treasury is then
forced to open its coffers to satisfy the vast portion of the
damages awarded.'6 Again, contribution is not available
69
against the carrier. 1
The standard of judicial review applicable to the Warsaw
Convention under the due process and equal protection
clauses is very deferential, but nevertheless there are few, if
12 See Burdell, 10 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 18,160. See also Kennelly, supra note 64, at 457-

58.
Kennelly, supra note 64, at 457-58.
See, e.g., Lloyd v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 429 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. Tenn. 1977) (plaintiff sued manufacturer; manufacturer filed third-party complaint against United
States).
,5 Kennelly, supra note 64, at 457-58.
Id. at 457.
,7 If this were not so, then a strictly liable manufacturer could sue a negligent airline for contribution and recover an amount in excess of the liability limitations under
the Warsaw Convention.
- Kennelly, supra note 64, at 459.
19 Kent v. Dulles, 347 U.S. 116, 125 (1958). If a taking is found, the government
will be bearing the brunt of any damages. See supra notes 73-91 and accompanying
text.
"'
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any, pronounced reasons for upholding the treaty. Regardless, to increase the likelihood of a successful challenge it may
be necessary for a plaintiff to invoke a higher level of judicial
scrutiny. 7 ' The plaintiffs in Bah/were aware of this need. In
order to ignite more intense review by the court, the plaintiffs
alleged the infringement of a fundamental right - the right
to travel.' 7 '
V.

DOES THE CONVENTION ABRIDGE THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO TRAVEL?

Unlike the individual liberties of speech, religion, press and
assembly, the right to travel is not expressly mentioned in the
United States Constitution. 72 Yet free movement is universally recognized as one of the cornerstones of the American
political system. 173 Consequently, the courts were quick to
recognize a fundamental right to travel freely from state to
state and within each state. 174 Whenever an exercise of police
power restricts the rights of persons to travel domestically, the
courts will usually employ a high level of scrutiny' to determine if an important governmental purpose is served by the
restriction.' 75 Additionally, the restriction imposed must be
the narrowest means of achieving the purpose of the law.' 76
The Supreme Court, however, has chosen to distinguish
domestic travel from international travel. 7 7 Interstate and
,," See supra note 143.
'7 Bali, 684 F.2d at 1309.
171Comment, ConstitutionalProtection of Foreign Travel, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 902, 913
(1981).
":1Grossman, The Right to Travel Takes a Wrong Turn, 11 HUMAN RTS. 34, 35 (Winter, No. 1 1983).
-7 The first Supreme Court decision to imply a constitutional right to travel was
Crandell v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868) (travelers tax held too burdensome on
right to travel).
171 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 32, at 806-16. The premier case on domestic
travel is Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (Court invalidated a residency
requirement for welfare benefits).
-; Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 634.
,17 See in/ra notes 182-214 and accompanying text. As will be discussed later, the

right to travel abroad must be carefully weighed against the broad powers of Congress
and the President in international relations. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 32, at
802.

934

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

[49

intrastate travel rights are rooted in the first amendment as
indistinguishable from the rights of free speech and association. 78 On the other hand, the Court has been unwilling to
recognize the right to travel abroad as a first amendment
guarantee where the right conflicts with United States foreign policy or national security. 7 9 Instead, international
travel has been protected under the fifth and fourteenth
amendments. 8 0 Judicial review of international travel restrictions has, for the most part, focused on passport restrictions imposed by either Congress or the President.'
Four
Supreme Court decisions establish the constitutional parameters in this area.
The first Supreme Court decision to address foreign travel
was Kent v. Dulles. ' 2 The case involved two American citizens who were members of the Communist Party.8 3 When
the pair attempted to obtain passports in order to attend a
conference in Europe, their requests were denied by the Secretary of State because they were active Communists. 8 '
Under the existing federal regulations, Communists were required t6 submit affidavits stating their ideology before a
valid passport could be issued. 85 One of the pair, Kent, refused to file such an affidavit.' 8 6 The Supreme Court overruled the Secretary of State, holding that he had exceeded his
power to deny passports under the powers delegated to him
by Congress. 8 7 The holding avoided a constitutional analysis, although the Court stated in dicta that freedom in foreign
travel is a protected liberty under the fifth amendment. 88
See Califano v. Asnavorian,
See infra text accompanying
See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S.
182-189, 230.
I'll See infra text accompanying
111 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958).
1w,Id at 117-18.
114

439 U.S. 170, 176 (1978).
notes 193-213.
116 (1958), discussedinfra in text accompanying notes
notes 182-214.

Id

Id at 118 & n.2.
Id at 119.
7 Id at 129. The Court refused to infer a delegation of Congressional authority to
the President allowing the State Department to promulgate the passport regulations
involved. Id
Id at 125.
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Language in the opinion also hinted at a first amendment
connection in certain unspecified instances. 8' 9
In Apitheker v. Secretary of S/ate'9° the Supreme Court struck
down a federal statute that expressly denied passports to citizens belonging to Communist organizations.19 ' The Court

based its holding on the overbreadth of the statute.' 92 The
national security rationale asserted by Congress was not suffi93
cient to warrant an across-the-board ban on foreign travel.'
The holding established that a travel restriction may constitute an abridgement of free speech and association rights.'94
When first amendment rights are involved, a regulation will
be upheld only if a less burdensome solution does not exist.' 95
The Supreme Court was confronted with the same issue
the following year in Zemel v. Rusk.' 96 Zemel arose from a denial by the Secretary of State of a passport application.' 97
Zemel was attempting to travel to Cuba during the Cuban
missile crisis.' 9 a Recognizing the danger to citizens traveling
to Cuba during the crisis and the need to protect national
security, the Court upheld the State Department's right to
restrict travel in certain areas of the world. 9 The Court held
,89 Id at 127. The Court stated: "Freedom to travel is, indeed, an important aspect
of the citizen's 'liberty.' We need not decide the extent to which it can be curtailed.
We are first concerned with the extent, if any, to which Congress has authorized its
curtailment." Id
1- 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
19, Id. at 514.
,92 Id at 508-14. The Court utilized a due process/equal protection test of review.
There was no dispute that the purposes of the Subversive Activities Control Act of
1950 were legitimate. However, the broad method of achieving the Act's goals was the
basis for overturning the Act. Id
19'

Id

Id at 511-12 & n.10. Since the ban on travel abroad imposed on the plaintiff
stifled his right to communicate with persons overseas, the Court used traditional first
amendment overbreadth analysis. Id Moreover, had he denounced his membership
in the Communist Party, he would have been issued a passport. This also amounted to
a violation of his associational rights under the first amendment. Id
, Id at 512-13 & n.ll.
- 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
197Id at 3. All U.S. citizens were denied passports to Cuba unless otherwise permitted by the Secretary of State. Id
'-

190

Id

- The Supreme Court refused to hold that the area restriction against travel to
Cuba was tantamount to an abridgement of the plaintiff's speech and association
rights. Id at 16. On this basis the Court distinguished Kent and Aptheker. Id Addi-
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that international travel bans do not always restrict first
amendment rights, particularly when national security or foreign policy is the basis for the ban," °
In a more recent case decided in 1981, Haig v. Agee,20 ' the
Supreme Court again addressed the issue of international
travel restrictions. Phillip Agee, an ex-CIA agent, became
disillusioned with CIA policies.20 2 In an attempt to undermine clandestine activities, he traveled to several countries to
expose CIA operatives.20 3 Shortly before he was to leave the
United States on one such journey, the State Department revoked his passport. 20 4 Agee challenged the regulation under
which the Secretary acted claiming it was overbroad under
the fifth amendment. 0 5 He also likened the passport revocation to a denial of free speech under the first amendment.20 6
The Supreme Court held that important governmental interests were served by the revocation because of the sensitive
and secret nature of statements being made by Agee. 20 7 The
Court concluded that in order to prevent harm to United
States intelligence gathering operations and to protect intelligence personnel overseas the Government's only option was
to revoke Agee's passport.20 8 On this basis the Secretary's ac-

tion was upheld.

9

Aptheker was distinguished by pointing

tionally, the Court recognized that the area restriction applied to all citizens; not just
certain groups. Id at 13. Traditional due process scrutiny was used to uphold the
restriction. Id. at 16.
- The decision indicates that the Court will exercise utmost restraint where national security or foreign policy is involved. Id at 10-12.
W. 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
202 Id at 283.
2'

Id

at 284.

Id. at 286.
Id. at 287.
-7 Id at 306. Revocation of passports in the interest of national security and foreign
policy was held to be a reasonable, and thus constitutional regulation. Id See also
Note, Conshiutional Law, 4 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 449, 455 (1982).
- 453 U.S. at 308.
Id The Court first concluded that the Passport Act did not give the Secretary of
State the right to revoke passports. In order to find implied Congressional approval of
the revocation the Court found it necessary to find an administrative practice sufficiently substantial and consistent to warrant a finding that Congress impliedly consented to the revocation. Id at 306. This stringent standard of review did not arise out
of any infringement of Agee's first amendment rights. Id at 308.
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out that Agee's action posed real danger to national security
as well as to citizens abroad and thus, was not merely a disagreement over political philosophy."' The Court, however,
did not use a first amendment level of scrutiny to reach its
decision even though the passport regulation
was held to
21
serve an important governmental purpose. '
These cases suggest that the right to travel overseas is not
as greatly protected by the Constitution as the right to travel
domestically. It appears that courts mainly will look to see if
a foreign travel restriction is supported by a reasonable state
interest.2" 2 This interest may include the welfare of the traveler himself, other citizens or national security.2 13 On the
other hand, a foreign travel restriction may be struck down if
it is so burdensome or arbitrary that it directly restricts the
exercise of first amendment rights.2 14
In Kent, Aptheker, Zemel and Agee the restriction on international travel was direct, i.e., the parties were not allowed to
leave the United States. In Bab, the plaintiffs argued that the
Warsaw limitations indirectly burdened the crash victims'
travel rights.2 1 5- The treaty does not prohibit international
travel, but if a citizen chooses to travel abroad his right to do
so is burdened since he or his survivors may not be able to
receive full compensation in the event of an accident.
Though the potential burden is great, the right to travel overseas is not directly restricted. Moreover, the liability limitations of the Convention imposes an economic burden on the
property rights of citizen travelers. 2 6 For this reason, low
level due process and equal protection scrutiny is arguably
appropriate because a distinct first amendment liberty is not
directly infringed. 1 7
2

Id

at 305.

Id. at 307.
2 2 Id at 306-07.
213 See supra notes 182-211 and accompanying text.
2'4 See supra notes 180-195 and accompanying text.
2'
684 F.2d at 1310.
211 Only where the economic burden is so arbitrary that it directly abridges first
amendment rights of speech and association will the courts utilize a strict scrutiny/overbreadth standard. See supra notes 190-195 and accompanying text.
21,7 Since first amendment rights are not at stake, the treaty is subject to review
2"
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The dicta in Bab*equated the right to travel outside the
United States with the fundamental right to travel freely domestically. 2 8 The court cited Aptheker in support of this
view.21 9 The Aptheker opinion, however, does not expressly
treat these distinct rights synonymously. 22° The Ba/i court

also pointed out that a travel restriction must be "carefully
tailored to serve a substantial and legitimate government interest," based again on the holding in Apth/eker.22 1 Yet in
Aplheker, the Secretary of State had imposed a regulation that
prohibited the issuance of passports to members of the Communist Party. 22 2 The Supreme Court considered this restriction to be a direct violation of the first amendment right of
free association. 3 Based on this finding, the Apheker Court
proceeded to use a high level of scrutiny to review the delegated rulemaking authority. 224 The facts in Ba/b4225 however,
do not give rise to a similar challenge predicated on an infringement of first amendment rights because citizens traveling abroad by air are not restricted in their speech or in their
association with others. 2 6
In the absence of a recognized fundamental right, there is
little precedential basis for a higher degree of scrutiny in cases
such as Bah Only a travel right protected under the fifth
and fourteenth amendments remains. 2 27 As discussed previ-

ously, the courts will employ a low level standard of review
where fundamental rights or suspect classes are not adversely
under the due process and equal protection clauses exclusively. See Comment, supra
note 172, at 926, 927. It can also be argued that the economic burden imposed by
article 22 is tantamount to a direct travel restriction.
2 684 F.2d at 1309. The court stated that "[i]nternational travel, like interstate
travel, is a fundamental right." Id (citations omitted).
Id
" See Aptheker, 378 U.S. 500, dircussedsupra b7text accompanying notes 190-195.
2
684 F.2d at 1309.
222378 U.S. at 501-02.
22..
See supra notes 192-195 and accompanying text.
2 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
2- 684 F.2d at 1304-06.
2; Compare Apiheker with Agee, discussed supra in notes 190-197, 201-211 and accompanying text.
27 See supra text accompanying note 180.
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affected.22
Arguably, there is no reason for the domestic/international
distinction in cases involving travel restrictions.229 In Kent the
court stated: "Travel abroad, like travel within the country,
may be necessary for a livelihood. It may be as close to the
heart of the individual as the choice of what he eats, or wears,
or reads. Freedom of movement is basic in our scheme of
values.

' 231

In Zemel and Agee the Government justified its ac-

tions with legitimate concern over the safety of citizens
abroad and national security. 23 ' In Agee the Supreme Court
recognized that the Government's only effective solution to
2 32
the risk posed by Agee was the revocation of his passport.
While it is not clear that the evidence presented by the Government in these two cases would have overcome first amendment scrutiny, it is clearly a possibility. The Bali dicta may
represent a judicial willingness to view international travel on
the same constitutional plane as domestic travel. 233
A.

Standing Problems that Arise in Challenges Based on the
ConstitutionalRight to Travel

Most cases involving the Warsaw Convention are wrongful
death suits brought by families of victims which may create a
conceptua! problem with a party's assertion of a deceased
family member's constitutional rights. The problem stems
from the fact that foreign travel is not generally protected
under the first amendment.2

34

In cases involving constitu-

tional issues other than those associated with the first amendment, a party generally does not have standing to adjudicate
See supra text accompanying notes 102-105, and note 143.
The Court's opinion in Agee strongly suggests that the same result could have
been reached if strict scrutiny had been used. 684 F.2d at 1310. Arguably, treatment
a"

of international travel as equivalent to interstate travel would not affect cases such as
Agee where important national security interests are threatened. See supra note 207.
357 U.S. at 126.
- See supra notes 215-229 and accompanying text.
2n 453 U.S. at 308.
-:,684 F.2d at 1309. It does not appear that the court was pronouncing any new
doctrine since the statement was merely dicta.
'4 See supra notes 177-180 and accompanying text.
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the constitutional rights of a third person.235 In Bah, standing was not an issue with regard to the due process and equal
protection arguments raised. The plaintiffs each had a personal stake in the outcome of the case, i.e., whether or not the
Warsaw Convention would limit their recoveries.2 36 The is-

sue of standing in cases such as Bah arises solely in the context of the right to travel argument. The claimants in Bah
asserted, as third parties, the travel rights of the crash
victims.

237

The Ninth Circuit in Bah recognized this standing problem, but failed to provide a definite solution.238 The court
did suggest that the right-to-travel challenge to the Warsaw
limitation by a victim's family "may be one of the cases in
which constitutional rights can be successfully protected only
if interested third parties are permitted to raise them. ' ' 239 Ad-

ditionally, the court noted that unless families are permitted
to assert the travel rights of their deceased relatives, the question of whether international air travelers are unduly burdened by the Warsaw limitations will continue to elude
judicial review. 24
In Griswold v. Connecticut, 241 the Supreme Court addressed a
case in which third parties attempted to assert another person's fundamental rights. Griswoldarose out of a Connecticut
statute that prohibited the use of contraceptives. Griswold, a
birth control clinic official, was prosecuted for aiding in and
abetting the use of contraceptives.242 He asserted the privacy
rights of married couples as a defense. 43 The Supreme Court
23,The rule against third-party standing stems from prudential concerns: the desire
to avoid constitutional issues and to insure that when such an issue is before a court, it
will be most effectively advocated. CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, supra note 32, at 87-88 &
n. 1. An exception to the third-party standing rule exists where a regulation, overbroad
in its effect, threatens to limit first amendment liberties. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415 (1963). See also CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, supra note 32, at 868.
2- See, e.g., 684 F.2d at 1310.
237 Id
2, Id at 1310.
239 Id
29

Id.

24, 381

U.S. 479 (1965).

242 Id.at 481.
243

Id
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held that Griswold had standing to assert the rights of married couples because "[t]he rights of husband and wife . .
are likely to be diluted or adversely affected unless those
rights are considered in a suit involving those who have this
kind of confidential relation to them. ' 244 Moreover, the
Court found it critical to their grant of standing that Griswold would be injured if he could not assert the rights of married couples.2 4 5
A claimant in a wrongful death action must, by definition,
have a close relationship with the deceased party. 4 6 In essence, the plaintiff is legally stepping into the shoes of the
person who has been killed. 47 There is also injury in fact to
the plaintiff in that the outcome of the claim will directly
affect the plaintiff's right to full recovery.24 8 Plaintiffs in aviation crash litigation have a strong incentive to fully develop
and litigate their claims since they are the beneficiaries of any
damages awarded. 249 As pointed out in Bal' the only practical way to protect the constitutional rights of international
travelers against possible infringement is to permit thirdparty standing. 250 Otherwise, a potentially burdensome restriction of liberty will persist.2 5'
,IId at 481. The Court thus focused on the nature of the relationship between the
parties and found that the rights of all would be detrimentally affected if the third
party had no standing to assess the married couples' rights. Id.at 481-86.
245

Id

' For example, Texas' wrongful death statute provides that: "Actions for damage
arising from death shall be for the sole and exclusive benefit of and may be brought by
the surviving husband, wife, children, and parents of the person whose death has been
caused or by either of them for the benefit of all.
...
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 4675 (Vernon 1952).
141Id. Wrongful death statutes put specified survivors in privity with their deceased
relatives for purposes of prosecuting all causes of action held by the decedent at his
death.
-""
The fundamental considerations in any standing issue are (1)whether the plaintiff has suffered "distinct and palpable" injury, and (2) whether there is a "traceable"
causal link between the injury suffered and the party sued. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
supra note 32, at 81.
1" See supra note 246.
- This was the argument presented by the defendant in Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965), discussed supra in notes 241-245 and accompanying text.
25 An international air traveler would not likely allege that the Warsaw Convention
restricted his right to travel if he were not the victim of an air accident. On the other
hand, if survivors of air crash victims are not allowed to assert the rights of their de-
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Courts have endorsed third-party standing in cases where
the nexus between the party asserting a right and the holder
of the right was less direct than in a wrongful death suit. In
Griswold an official was allowed to assert the rights of married
couples. Other cases have allowed members of organizations
to assert the constitutional rights of fellow members.252 Federal and state governments have successfully asserted the
rights of citizens in certain cases.253
The test for third-party standing is not rigid. 25 4 The courts

will consider the connection between the party asserting the
right and the holder of the right. 255 If the relationship is sub-

stantial enough that the right will be adequately protected,
and if failure to grant standing will likely preclude judicial
review of a constitutional issue, a court will probably proceed
to the merits of the challenge. If a court should decide to
address the constitutionality of article 22 of the Warsaw Convention in a wrongful death action, there is an adequate basis
to allow third parties to allege violations of their deceased
relatives' travel rights. 56
VI.

CONCLUSION

Air carriers in the United States are no longer in need of
special liability limitation protection. The airline industry
today boasts an impressive safety record. Liability insurance
is now available at a nominal cost. Thus, the stated purpose
ceased kin, the constitutional issue surrounding the treaty will continue to evade judicial review in the same way that abortion cases evaded scrutiny until Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973).
" 381 U.S. at 481.
25:,
See, e.g., Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333
(1977) (trade association allowed to challenge state law harmful to apple growers on
behalf of its member growers); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981) (Maryland
granted standing to challenge Louisiana tax on natural gas on behalf of its citizens,
who were consumers of such natural gas).
254 See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW supra note 32, at 90.
255 Id. The authors state "the Court should only forbid third party standing if it is
persuaded that the party seeking standing will not be an adequate representative of the
third parties whose interests he champions." Id (citing Rohr, Fghtingfor the Rights of
Others. The Troubled Law of Third Party Standing and Mootness in the Federal Courts, 35
MIAMI L. REV. 393 (1981)).
2"
See supra text accompanying notes 252-255.
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for the United States' adoption of the Warsaw Convention
has been achieved. Moreover, plaintiffs whose recoveries are
severely limited by the treaty do not receive anything meaningful in return because the presumption of airline fault created under the treaty has basically the same effect as the
doctrine of res ipsa /oquidur.25 7
From the defendants' perspective, article 22 of the treaty is
equally inequitable. Manufacturers are often exposed to
most of the damages awarded in tort litigation since the right
to contribution does not apply to air carriers beyond the liability limit of the treaty. The United States Treasury may
also be required to satisfy a disproportionate amount of damages awarded in suits where both an airline and the United
States are held liable for an international air disaster. Ultimately, someone must bear the cost of injuries and death sustained in air crashes. Arguably, air carriers should absorb
this cost since their insurors are willing to insure the risk at
modest rates.
Historically, treaties have been avoided as taboo by the judicial branch. Though the Constitution does not clearly delineate constitutional roles in international affairs, history
and tradition have placed the vast portion of power over this
realm of government in the executive branch. Congress as
well has substantial authority over international policy since
it must approve all treaties before they can become the "law
of the land. 2 58 In addition, Congress has express constitutional power over international commerce. The Supreme
Court has exercised restraint in cases involving treaties and
foreign policy, but it has also firmly established its right to
scrutinize treaties under the Constitution if it ever chooses to
do so. Many argue that the time for constitutional review of
the Warsaw Convention is ripe and that article 22 of the
Convention cannot withstand judicial scrutiny.
If a court, state or federal, were to examine the liability
limitations of the Convention under the Constitution it likely
would apply a minimal level of scrutiny. Heightened scruSee supra note 13 and accompanying text.
-'1 See supra text accompanying note 31.
2,7
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tiny is probably not available since the liability limitations of
the Convention do not directly infringe upon any first
amendment or other judicially-recognized fundamental
rights. This deferential type of review is susceptible to many
arguments, any one of which would support continued adherence to article 22 of the treaty. It is widely agreed that the
Warsaw Convention is a landmark international trade agreement and as such, it is intertwined with United States foreign
policy. It is unlikely that the courts would upset a fragile balance of political policy if such a policy were vigorously propounded by the President in support of the Warsaw
Convention.
The political branches of the Government may choose to
remain silent on whether the treaty should be upheld in the
United States rather than risk criticism from the rest of the
world for rejecting a critical provision of a long adhered-to
international agreement. The Senate, however, has expressed
its apparent disdain over the imposition of any form of liability limitation. The Montreal Protocol took over ten years to
negotiate and draft. For this reason it is unlikely that a new
Protocol with a higher recovery ceiling will arrive any time
soon. Perhaps the Montreal Protocol will be resubmitted for
Senate approval. If an unlimited supplemental recovery system rider were added to the Protocol's recovery ceiling, such
a package might gain ratification. At present, however, the
President and Congress are at an impasse over the proper solution to the meager recoveries available under article 22 of
the treaty.
When viewed in this light, the courts may be the only
branch able to relieve the burden that article 22 of the treaty
places on plaintiffs and co-defendants. Yet it is uncertain at
best whether the limitations would collapse under the weight
of low level judicial scutiny. If heightened scrutiny were utilized by a court, it is doubtful that article 22 would be upheld. Thus, the type of judicial scrutiny used is the key to the
treaty's constitutionality. No available theory exists on which
a court may employ heightened scrutiny in a due process or
equal protection challenge to article 22. The most persuasive
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argument supporting stringent review is that the treaty violates the fundamental right of citizens to travel. Though the
freedom to travel abroad has not been as fiercely protected as
the right to travel domestically, the rationale for the distinction is questionable. Perhaps the Ninth Circuit in Bah recognized the need to ignore the domestic/international
distinction. 25 9 Unfortunately these questions are likely to
evade judicial consideration until another international air
tragedy occurs.

219

See supra text accompanying note 218.

